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Abstract—Social routing protocols are typically used to transfer 
messages among users and services in mobile opportunistic 
networks. Adaptive mechanisms are needed for achieving user 
anonymization and providing sufficient level of user anonymity 
due to the constant changes in underlying topology, mobility 
patterns and density of users and their queries. This paper 
describes a novel flexible and adaptive approach, AdaptAnon 
that is suitable for dynamic and heterogeneous mobile 
opportunistic networks. Our approach is multidimensional and 
combines multiple heuristics based on user profiles, analysis of 
user connectivity and history of anonymization in order to 
predict and decide on the best set of nodes that anonymize the 
sending node. Our results of extensive experiments show that 
AdaptAnon achieves higher quality of anonymization in terms of 
both the number of nodes and the diversity of nodes in the 
anonymization layer for varying query intensity and over 
different sender and destination degrees of connectivity while 
neither decreasing success ratios nor increasing latency. We 
show that AdaptAnon outperforms state of the art single 
dimensional anonymization approaches when run over three 
different real-life traces. 
Keywords-Mobile social networks; Anonymity; Adaptive 
networks 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Due to the recent wide penetration of mobile devices in 
everyday’s life activities, there has been an intense research on 
how to design data dissemination protocols within mobile 
social opportunistic networks [1,2,3,4,12,17,18]. These 
protocols are typically based on the assumption that 
encounters between mobile devices are more likely to occur 
between people in the same social network than between 
random strangers – i.e. messages may be forwarded 
selectively only within the sender's social network. This paper 
addresses the problem of privacy in opportunistic network 
routing schemes and argues that using social network for 
forwarding can be damaging for maintaining sender’s 
anonymity due to routing protocols repeatedly using similar 
(friendly) nodes for forwarding and anonymizing their 
messages. In particular, we explore how to design adaptive 
anonymous overlays in social opportunistic networks that aim 
to maximise the quality of anonymization while maintaining 
high success ratios of answered queries and low delays. As the 
underlying density of network may change dramatically and 
the user interests may also vary, it is important that the 
anonymization overlay is responsive both to the underlying 
topology as well as to the users’ interests.  We propose a 
multidimensional K-anonymity approach for designing 
anonymous overlays (paths) to hide the senders’ identity from 
the service. Our approach aims to dynamically and adaptively 
balance the tradeoff between quality of anonymization, and 
success ratios and delays of answered queries. We refer to the 
quality of anonymization as a combined measure of the 
number of nodes and the diversity of the nodes used in the 
anonymization path for a given sender and a given service. As 
our networks are intermittently connected and potentially have 
large delays, discovering the entire “anonymization overlay” 
at any one time is not possible, and this paper, instead, focused 
on how to build an “anonymization path” that allows 
opportunistic, asynchronous discovery of nodes that can 
perform user anonymization.  
Emerging research [23] on characteristics of mobile 
advertising shows that almost all advertisements are selected 
based on the users’ profiles created over time or recent 
environmental context and that advertising traffic volume is 
significantly higher than that of the application traffic. This 
paper aims to address this by making users’ context and long 
term profiles less predictable. Our proposal, AdaptAnon, 
manages to extend the length of the anonymity path and 
increase the diversity of the nodes in it. We propose a set of 
multiple heuristics for tracking anonymization history and 
adaptively selecting more suitable anonymizers. We show that 
increasing the length of the anonymity path leads to the 
increase of repetitive choice of the nodes on the path and thus 
decreases the quality of anonymization as it becomes more 
predictable. On the other hand, if we increase the diversity of 
chosen nodes, the length of the anonymization path decreases 
because the nodes have fewer appropriate next hop options but 
decreases predictability in the overlay improving 
anonymization.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. After a 
review of the related work in Section 2, we describe a set of 
new heuristics that are at the core of AdaptAnon and give 
pseudo code of AdaptAnon in Section 3. In section 4, we 
describe results from extensive evaluation of AdaptAnon 
against three other anonymization protocols across a range of 
metrics over a real social mobility trace from Crawdad [20]. 
II. RELATED WORK 
This section gives a brief overview of anonymity 
approaches in peer to peer communications, social 
opportunistic networks and mobile networks.  
Peer to peer anonymity approaches such as Tor[13], 
Tarzan[14], Crowds[16] are all based on routing the traffic 
over virtual “circuits” that are established by randomly 
choosing a sequence of nodes but vary in the length of the 
  
route and level of encryption. All of these schemes rely on a 
global list of all participants being shared among all the 
participants and thus have limited scalability. There are 
several proposals for anonymity schemes based on DHT 
overlays in the literature [5,6] but these schemes are not 
suitable for the opportunistic ad hoc and mobile scenarios that 
we target.  
[7] considers social network routing that is based on 
disseminating information about the social network and 
describes the privacy concerns it introduces. It proposes two 
methods for enhancing privacy in social network routing by 
obfuscating the social network graphs used to inform routing 
decisions and show that it is possible to obfuscate the social 
network information without significantly decreasing routing 
performance. In [16], mobile users get classified in different 
areas according to their social behaviour and observe that 
under certain circumstances, that are common in real life 
situations, the effectiveness of dissemination predominantly 
depends on the number of users in each class rather than their 
social behaviour. [17] proposes PeopleRank approach in 
which nodes are ranked using a tuneable weighted social 
information that gives higher weight to nodes if they are 
socially connected to other important nodes of the network  
and manages to deliver messages with near optimal success 
rate.  
[9] proposes AnonySense, a privacy-aware system for 
realizing pervasive applications based on collaborative, 
opportunistic sensing by personal mobile devices. However, 
they assume that the nodes who wish to participate in the 
AnonySense have to register with the registration authority as 
well as that the IP addresses and  certificates of the task 
service (TS) and the report service are installed on the mobile 
nodes. [10] describes SMILE, a mobile social service in which 
trust is established solely on the basis of shared encounters and 
anonymous users’ ability to prove to each other that they 
shared an encounter in the past. SMILE uses standard 
cryptographic primitives that assume existence of trusted third 
party.  
[18] proposes software (SpotME) that can run on a mobile 
phone and is able to estimate the number of people in 
geographic locations in a privacy-preserving way: accurate 
estimations are made possible in the presence of privacy-
conscious users who report, in addition to their actual 
locations, a very large number of erroneous locations. [21] 
proposes constructing a Privacy Analytics framework that uses 
the Dataware framework [20] to enable querying and 
measurements of  large public datasets without leaking 
intermediate results and potentially compromising privacy. 
[21] aims to verify the query code, and then send it to the user 
community to perform measurement tasks, collect variable 
statistics, and  perform aggregation and fuzzing while 
remaining within the community. 
[23] proposes middleware, CAMEO, that uses predictive 
profiling of a user’s device, network and usage context to 
anticipate the advertisements to be sent, and then modulates 
their delivery mechanism to enable effective and low cost 
mobile advertising. CAMEO manages to cache appropriate 
advertisements in advance for future display to each user. [19] 
proposed SLPD protocol based on social network driven K-
anonymity for location privacy but showed that SLPD’s query 
success ratios quickly drop below 20% for privacy level above 
20%. 
III. ADAPTANON PROPOSAL DESIGN OVERVIEW 
Three challenges in the design of the anonymous overlay 
networks in social mobile opportunistic networks that we 
focus on concern the relationship between the level of security 
provided for different 1) the density of users and services, 2) 
length of the anonymization path (K) and 3) diversity of the 
users on the anonymization path. More specifically, this refers 
to how to “hide” a user among not only more users and but 
also more diverse users in order to provide higher quality 
anonymity for changing underlying topologies. Because 
improving anonymity can have negative impact on success 
ratio and latency of the user-service communication, it is 
important to dynamically balance the tradeoff between the 
anonymity and the actual quality of service. 
This section proposes novel flexible, multi-dimensional 
approach to K-anonymity (AdaptAnon) that enables 
opportunistic identification and selection of the overlay 
anonymization nodes in order to allow for better tradeoff 
management between the length of the obfuscation path and 
the diversity of the nodes on it while not degrading success 
ratio and delays. We propose to dynamically combine three 
types of implicit fully localized heuristics that are rooted in 
social complex graph theory that enable better prioritisation of 
nodes based on their connectivity patterns, user and interest 
profile similarity, and anonymization history. 
The choice of which connectivity, user profile and 
anonymization history heuristics to consider and how to 
combine them determines the effectiveness of our proposal. 
First we motivate and describe each of our heuristics in order 
to show how they are important for managing the tradeoffs. 
A. Heuristics 
Heuristics driven by the network topology and contact 
history analysis: Each node performs analysis of node’s past 
interactions and consists of three locally evaluated 
components: a node’s “betweenness” centrality[1,2,12], social 
“similarity”[1,2,12] and tie strength relationship[1,2,12] to the 
service (destination node). This is important because of two 
reasons: first, it allows AdaptAnon to be responsive to the 
changes in the network topology and mobility patterns; and 
second it allows the choice of the nodes in the anonymization 
overlay that support directional routing [12] to the service. For 
the purposes of this paper, AdaptAnon takes into consideration 
SocialSimilarity and ServiceRecency. SocialSimilarity refers to 
connectivity similarity between the Service and the source’s 
neighbour. The similarity calculation, where C(N) and C(S) 
are the set of contacts held by node N and service S 
respectively, is given as follows: 
	
,  = | ∩ | 1 
ServiceRecency is obtained by dividing the number of 
seconds of the node with the oldest contact with the Service by 
the number of seconds since the neighbour last saw the 
Service. The ServiceRecency indicator is based on how 
recently node N has encountered a Service and is calculated as 
length of time between node N last encountering Service S 
(denoted as Recency(N,S)) divided by the difference between 
the time node N has been on the network (T(N) and 
Recency(N,S): 

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Heuristics driven by interest and user profile analysis: We 
assume that each node has a dynamic set of L profile attributes 
where each of the attributes can include any of the following 
types of profiles: predetermined interest keywords and user 
demographic information, ad hoc and new interests in order to 
allow expansion of the existing interests, social networks and 
friends’ lists. This metric is important because of two reasons: 
first it allows AdaptAnon to be responsive to the changes in 
the application and user preferences; and second it avoids 
extensive usage of the nodes that are not interested in certain 
services or content. Each node analyses the degree of interest 
and user similarity it shares with nodes that it meets based on 
the number of matched profile attributes (denoted as 
LabelSimilarity) versus the number of total attributes (L). 
We use Jaccard’s coefficient that takes into account not 
just similarity but also dissimilarity of the nodes’ interests and 
is defined as the size of the intersection divided by the size of 
the union of the sample sets. 
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Combining social connectivity driven and profile driven 
metrics allows AdaptAnon to increase the length of the 
anonymization path (K) compared to using only one of these 
two metrics alone because it allows more options for the next 
hop anonymization node on the anonymization path. 
However, due to spatial and temporal locality of reference 
principles, this can result in predictable choices of the nodes in 
the anonymization layer and thus have negative impact on the 
anonymization quality.  
In order to counterbalance the decidability of the previous 
two heuristics, we propose the third type of heuristics that is 
driven by the anonymization history analysis performed by 
every node and for every potential anonymizing node. This 
heuristics allows AdaptAnon to increase the diversity of the 
nodes in the K overlay in order to improve the utilisation of 
the overlay nodes. Our aim is to avoid overuse and underuse 
of some nodes in the anonymization layer. For example if the 
source frequently uses the same node(s) for anonymization, all 
the nodes become more predictable and more easily profiled 
(e.g. only 8 messages are sufficient to decide on who the 
source is [7] for a social mobility trace in St Andrews 
University Campus for 27 students over 79 days and thus the 
effectiveness of the overlay nodes’ utilisation is significantly 
decreased). However, in cases when there are multiple sources 
that are repeatedly utilising the same overlay in such a way 
that a single source’s usage forms a small fraction of the other 
sources’ usage, the effectiveness of using the same nodes (or 
overlay) by the same source without being easily profiled is 
higher. Finally, even if one node alone uses the same node(s) 
repeatedly and in a predictable fashion, but uses them for 
different services in an unpredictable manner, such a quality of 
anonymization can also be high as it is less predictable and 
more difficult to profile.  
In order to manage this dynamic tradeoff between these 
different dynamic anonymization criteria, when a node 
chooses the next hop node in the overlay, it has to address the 
following questions regarding the potential next hop 
anonymization node by introducing the following three 
heuristics: 
Each node keeps track of how often a potential next hop 
has been on the anonymization path for any source node and 
for any service defined as AnonCnt(N). The more popular the 
node is, the more desirable it is where other nodes are using it.  
Each node keeps track of how often the potential next hop 
has been on the anonymization path for this origin defined as 
OriginAnonymCnt(N). The more often it has been used by a 
particular source node, the less desirable it is for that node. 
Each node keeps track of how often the potential next hop 
has been on the anonymization path for this service defined as 
ServiceAnonymCount(S, N). The more often it has been used 
for a particular service, the less desirable it is for that service. 
Each node keeps track of the ratio of the number of times 
the next hop has been used by the given origin and by all other 
sources in order to be able to make less greedy decisions. The 
lower this ratio is, the more desirable this next hop is as a 
particular source node is less predictable. This is defined as 
NodeRatio in heuristic 4:  
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Where  represents the set of all nodes that has requested 
anonymization through this node. Each node keeps the ratio of 
the number of times the next hop has been on the 
anonymization path for the particular Service and has been 
used for all other services. This is important in order to make 
less greedy decisions. The lower this ratio is, the more 
desirable this next hop is as the given source node is less likely 
to be profiled. This is defined as ServiceRatio in heuristic 5: 
	  =  
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Where  represents the set of all services for which the 
node has provided anonymization. Each node keep track of the 
ratio of the number of times the next hop has been used to 
anonymize this source for this service, and the number of 
times it has anonymized other nodes for this service.  This is 
defined as ServiceNodeRatio in heuristic 6: 
)	 ,  =
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Each node monitors AnonCnt, OriginAnonymCnt and 
ServiceAnonymCount, and then performs statistical analysis 
described in heuristics 4, 5 and 6 in order to allow for adaptive 
reuse of anonymization nodes that keeps balance between 
reusing the same nodes and using nodes that already have 
experience in providing anonymization. 
Note that in this paper we assume equal weights between 
heuristics but it is also possible to use different weighing 
models in order to prioritise some criteria over the others if 
that is suitable. For example, for highly social traces it would 
be desirable to assign lower weight to social heuristics as to 
minimise the repeatability of path choices. Similarly, for non-
social traces social weighting might be increased. If there are 
only few nodes that share similar profiles, the weights of the 
labels heuristics should be decreased to avoid easy node 
identification. When the trace is highly predictable either due 
to the percentage of label similarity of nodes or strong social 
connectivities, adaptive history anonymization heuristics 
should be weighted the highest because of its intelligent 
diversification factor that ensures neither overutilization nor 
underutilisation of anonymization nodes. 
  
B. AdaptAnon pseudo code 
We now describe our AdaptAnon pseudo code in more 
detail (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1 AdaptAnon pseudo code 
 
Each node scans the neighbourhood, detects all nearby 
contacts and adds them to the list of current neighbours. If a 
node is not a source node of a query, it receives a query from a 
neighbouring node and increments the AnonymizationHops 
counter of the query for every node. Each node performs the 
following actions for each member of the list of neighbours: If 
the neighbour has already anonymized this query, then the 
neighbour should not be used so it gets skipped (step 1). If the 
neighbour is the location based service itself then the node 
checks if the query has been forwarded by sufficiently many 
nodes already, i.e. if its AnonymizationHops is higher than 
requiredAnonymizationHop.s If so, the query gets sent to the 
service, otherwise the node skips the neighbour (step 2) . The 
node monitors and calculates the three types of heuristics 
described in section 3.1 (step 3). The node then calculates the 
total anonymization utility based on the operation mode: For 
Label mode only LabelSimilarity is used for calculating the 
total utility. For Social mode the social utilities are used for 
calculating the total utility: SocialSimilarity and 
ServiceRecency. For Mixed mode the Label and Social 
utilities are both used for calculating the Total utility. For 
AdaptAnon mode mixed mode is extended with Anonymity 
heuristics and statistics. The node with the best total utility 
(the sum of all heuristics) is chosen and the query gets sent to 
it for anonymization. In the above code, we assume that 
heuristics are all equally weighted. More in depth analyses of 
different weighting heuristics is out of the scope of this paper. 
To return the answer to the query, the service responds to 
the last node in the anonymization path, that node is aware of 
the source identity and uses label and social heuristics for 
routing the query back to the source without diversification. 
IV. EXPERIMENT SET-UP AND EVALUATION 
This section describes a range of experiments that show 
AdaptAnon performance results over a real connectivity trace 
with varying underlying connectivity and query patterns 
across a range of metrics. Our metrics includes success ratio 
and latency of anonymized answered queries, anonymization 
path length and diversity factor of the nodes on the 
anonymization path. We use realistic social connectivity trace 
Infocom 2006 [20] and compare AdaptAnon to three other 
comparative algorithms: social connectivity only, label and 
mixed. 
We perform analysis of the nodes’ encounter rates, i.e., 
rates at which nodes come into contact with each other, and 
determine the median contact times via the notion of the 
angular node flux. Then we consider a number of scenarios 
where we select, first senders, and then services that have 
varying degrees of connectivity. We first explore the influence 
of varying load patterns on the four chosen metrics. 
A. Increasing the number of queries:  
With increasing number of queries and requests for 
anonymization, the number of nodes that anonymize other 
nodes rises and also the number of times that certain nodes 
anonymize queries for the same service increases in 
comparison to the total number of anonymization requests. 
This in turn can damage the actual quality of anonymization as 
 
(a)   (b)  
Figure 2.  Query success ratio and delay with increasing query rate 
 
(a)   (b) 
Figure 3.  Anonymization path length and diversity with increasing query rate 
Query query = null; 
List Contacts = null; 
If (Node.isOriginatingNode) Then: 
   query = new Query(); 
Else 
Query = recvQuery(); 
Query.AnonymizationHops++; 
End If 
Contacts = ScanNeighobourhood(); 
For Each Contact in Contacts Do: 
If (Contact.hasAnonymized(Query) Then  
Next; 
End If 
If (Contact.isService) Then 
If (query.AnonymizationHops <requiredAnonymizationHops) 
Then 
Next; 
End If 
Node.sendQuery(Contact); 
Break; 
End If 
Contact.LabelSimilarity = calculateLabelSimilarity(); 
Contact.SocialSimilarity = calculateSocialSimilarity(); 
Contact.ServiceRecency = Contact.timeHasSeenService(); 
Contact.NodeRatio = 
Contact.cntAnon(query.Node)/Contact.cntAnon(query.Total); 
Contact.Service Ratio = 
Contact.cntAnon(query.Service)/Contact.cntAnon(query.Total); 
Contact.ServiceNodeRatio 
=Intersection(Contact.countAnon(query.Node), 
Contact.countAnon(query.Service)) / 
Contact.countAnonymization(query.Service); 
Contact.AdaptAnonUtility = α*Contact.SocialSimilarity +  
β*Contact.ServiceRecency + γ*Contact.ServiceNodeRatio+  
δ*Contact.LabelSimilarity; 
If (Contact.AdaptAnonUtility > Contacts[0]) Then 
Contacts.swap(Contacts,Contact[0], Contact); 
End If 
End For 
Node.sendQuery(Contacts[0]); 
  
the same nodes can be used repeatedly as described in Section 
III. 
Figures 2 and 3 compare performance of AdaptAnon with 
mixed approach (combined social connectivity and label 
approach without randomisation), social connectivity and 
label/profile approaches for the increasing number of queries  
in terms of success ratio of answered queries, latency and 
number of nodes in the anonymization overlay (level of 
anonymity). 
Figure 2a shows that AdaptAnon does not decrease 
success ratios of answered queries compared to Social and 
Mixed approaches but has about 60% higher success rates 
compared to the profile-based only approach. This is due to 
utilising multiple criteria for both routing and answering back 
the queries and thus utilising its better network knowledge. 
Figure 2b shows that AdaptAnon gracefully increases latency 
when compared to the social and mixed approaches. This is 
expected as AdaptAnon does not use the most direct path to 
the Service but includes label matching that allows better 
diversity of the nodes in the overlay. AdaptAnon is marginally 
slower than mixed approach because it includes randomisation 
factor that can delay the selection process for the next hop 
nodes. It is interesting to see that AdaptAnon manages 80% 
lower latency compared to the label approach. Figure 3a 
shows that AdaptAnon has 15% higher length of the 
anonymization path than the Social approach, and more than 
two times higher than for the Label approach. It is expected 
that the social approach performs significantly better than the 
Label approach as the trace we are using is a social trace and 
the label approach is not adaptive. Our mixed approach 
maintains highest anonymity levels because it is more flexible 
approach to K-anonymity that chooses the nodes according to 
one dimension and allows for a higher degree of optimization, 
and does not include diversification factor as AdaptAnon does. 
Figure 3b shows that AdaptAnon achieves more than two 
times better quality of diversity (higher diversity) than Social 
approach and more than three times higher diversity than 
Label only approach across all number of queries as it is the 
only one that monitors and intelligently to diversifies the 
previous node choices for the paths. 
B. Sender connectivity 
To investigate how the connectivity of the senders 
influences success ratios of answered queries, delays and the 
level of anonymity quality of anonymity and delay, we 
perform a number of experiments for five different categories 
of senders ranging from highly connected to low connectivity. 
For all the nodes in the Infocom connectivity trace we analyze 
each node’s connectivity patterns (inter-contact times) and we 
classify the nodes into mean connectivity, 25% up and down 
of the mean, and top and bottom 25%. We then choose 10% of 
the nodes from each connectivity category to be senders. We 
randomly choose ten receivers that have above the average 
connectivity (in terms of node inter-contact times) so that they 
do not influence the results. 
Figure 4a shows that better connected sender typically 
achieves higher success ratios of their answered queries for all 
four approaches to anonymization. AdapAnon does not lower 
the success ratio compared to the Social and Mixed 
approaches, and is 60% higher than the label approach. In 
terms of latency, Figure 4b shows  that AdaptAnon is only 
20% slower than the Social approach (which aims the most 
direct route to the service) and only 10% lower than mixed 
approach (that does not include diversification factor) while it 
is 90% faster than the label approach for all senders 
connectivity levels. 
Figure 5a shows that AdaptAnon achieves higher number 
of nodes in the overlay than social and label approaches, but is 
particularly better for the medium senders’ connectivity. 
AdaptAnon shows about marginally lower (5%) level of 
anonymity than the mixed approach. This is because 
AdaptAnon uses multiple criteria of choosing the K nodes and 
utilises better knowledge of the network and user profiles. 
Figure 5b shows that AdaptAnon achieves more than 80% 
better quality of diversity (higher diversity factor) than Social 
approach and more than three times higher diversity than 
Label only approach across all levels of sender connectivity. 
This is because it is the only one that intelligently diversifies 
the previous anonymization node choices. 
C. Service connectivity 
To investigate how the connectivity of receivers influences 
the success ratios of answered queries, level of anonymity and 
delays, we perform a number of experiments for five different 
categories of receivers ranging from highly connected to low 
connectivity. For these experiments, we randomly choose 
above average connected senders so that they do not influence 
the results. Figures 6 and 7 show similar results as with the 
increasing connectivity of the senders.  AdaptAnon does not 
decrease success ratios compared to mixed, label and social 
approaches while it marginally increased delays. 
Figure 7b shows that AdaptAnon achieves more than 90% 
better quality of diversity (higher diversity) than Social 
approach and more than two times higher diversity than Label 
only approach across all service connectivities. 
 
 
(a)   (b) 
Figure 4.  Success ratio and delay with decreasing senders connectivity 
\  
(a)   (b)  
Figure 5.  Anonymization path length and diversity factor with varying 
sender connectivity 
  
Figure 8 compares quality of anonymization and 
diversification across three real traces Infocom2006[20]. 
Sassy[8], SF Cabs[11]. We observe that AdaptAnon 
achieves twice as good diversity factor compared to the Label, 
Social and mixed approaches while maintaining comparable 
levels of K – 3 times higher that Label, 20% higher than 
Social and 20% lower that the mixed approach. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has two contributions: First, AdaptAnon 
achieves higher K (number of nodes in the overlay) compared 
to non-adaptive K-anonymity approaches over a wide range of 
query and connectivity patterns  while keeping similar success 
ratios and delays to traditional approaches that use social 
connectivity only [1,2,4,12] or label only approaches[7,19].  
Second, AdaptAnon achieves higher diversity of the nodes in 
the anonymization overlay compared to other single 
dimensional approaches due to our multidimensional criteria 
for a range of Ks than label-only and social connectivity -only 
approaches. We show that AdaptAnon achieves better 
utilisation of nodes and higher quality of anonymization even 
for low Ks (when K is equal to 2 and 3) that are the most 
realistic achievable Ks for realistic connectivity traces. Our 
results show what the critical connectivity of sender and 
services should be in order to allow different qualities of 
anonymization as well as what level of services (in terms of 
success ratios and delays of answered queries) can be expected 
for these anonymization levels. Our result can inform the 
decision of the number of placement of servers that allow 
different levels of anonymity while providing good services. 
For our future work, we plan to investigate the performance of 
AdaptAnon over heterogeneous realistic connectivity traces 
and the suitability of different models of weightings between 
the heuristics. 
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Figure 6.  Success ratio and delay with varying service connectivity 
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Figure 7.  Anonymization path length and diversity factor with varying 
service connectivity 
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Figure 8.  K and D factors 
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